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Abstract
While there is substantial corruption in developing countries, the costs imposed by
corruption on individuals and households are little understood. This study examines
the relationship between exposure to local corruption and mental health, as measured
by depressive symptoms. We use two large data sets - one cross-sectional and one panel
- collected across rural Vietnam. After controlling for individual and regional charac-
teristics, we find strong and consistent evidence that day-to-day petty corruption is
positively associated with psychological distress. Our results are robust to a variety
of specification checks. Further, we find that the relationship between corruption and
mental health is stronger for women, and that there are no heterogeneous effects by
poverty status. Finally, using a difference-in-difference estimation strategy, we provide
suggestive evidence that a recent highly profiled anti-corruption campaign had signifi-
cant positive effects on mental health. Overall, our findings suggest that there may be
substantial psychosocial and mental health benefits from efforts to reduce corruption
and improve rural governance structures.
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1 Introduction
Corruption is widespread in developing countries and there is universal agreement that cor-
ruption needs to be addressed to achieve inclusive economic growth (Olken and Pande,
2012). Reflecting this concern, combating corruption is a target under the United Nations’
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, the gamut of costs imposed by corruption
on individuals is little understood. In this paper, we assess the relationship between petty
corruption and mental health in a developing country.
Being a victim of petty corruption can affect mental health for a variety of reasons. First, in
low-income countries, harassment bribes represent a form of regressive income tax and are
usually a non-trivial part of one’s income, especially for poorer households. For instance,
using data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, Bai et al. (2019) find that even within
countries, smaller firms pay higher bribes as a proportion of their income. Bribes therefore
worsen economic conditions, and income loss has been shown to be detrimental to one’s
mental health (Adhvaryu et al. 2019; Christian et al., 2019).1 Second, the element of
arbitrariness and uncertainty in bribe payments (the target, frequency and size of bribe)
also creates anxiety, and can be particularly damaging for poor households.2
Third, harassment bribes induce feelings of helplessness and disenfranchisement as access
to essential services such as health, education and public administration is dictated by the
bribe-seeker who is a corrupt public official. This erodes trust in local governance and
accountability structures, and/or reduce social capital in communities, thereby worsening
mental health (Tavits, 2008). Finally, experiences of corruption may also reduce one’s returns
to labour effort through expropriation of resources, induce pessimistic beliefs about oneself,
1By worsening the supply of public goods such as access to healthcare, corruption, due to misallocation of
resources, may also lead to poorer physical and mental health (Azfar and Gurgur, 2008; Dincer and Teoman,
2019).
2Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Wei (1997) argue that the uncertainty characterizing corrupt transactions
could also be of first-order importance in deterring investment.
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and lead to adverse mental health. de Quidt and Haushofer (2019) argue that this could
also result in a ‘depression poverty trap’.
Using first-hand cross-sectional and panel data collected across rural Vietnam, we find con-
sistent evidence that day-to-day petty corruption is positively associated with psychological
distress as measured by a standard depression index. We find that a one standard deviation
increase in corruption is associated with a 7-12 percent increase in the CES-D index and a
20-24 percent increase in the likelihood of exhibiting symptoms of depression. These results
are robust to controlling for several individual and community characteristics and a number
of other checks. Worryingly, we also find the negative association between corruption and
mental health to be stronger for women. We also examine the effects of anti-corruption ef-
forts on mental health. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary Nguyen
Phu Trong launched an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign in 2016, which resulted in
several high-profile arrests and disciplining of government officials. Exploiting variation in
exposure to corruption at the start of the campaign, we find evidence suggesting that this
anti-corruption campaign had positive effects on mental health.
This paper contributes to two broad strands of research. The first is the literature examining
the effects of corruption. Most studies have documented costs of corruption on economic
growth, investment, provision of public goods, and firm profitability and innovation (e.g.,
Mauro, 1995; Paunov, 2016; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; O’Toole and Tarp, 2014). How-
ever, only a few recent studies exist that have examined the link between corruption and
mental health. Using cross-country data from Europe and Africa, these papers find a neg-
ative association between society-level and directly experienced corruption and indicators
of mental wellbeing (Gillanders, 2016; van Deurzen, 2017).3 Our study uses individual and
household-level data from one country and allows us to control for common influences at
3There is also some work showing that corruption negatively affects life satisfaction and happiness (Sule-
mana et al., 2017; Tavits, 2008).
2
either the household or the village level. This is an improvement over other studies that
pool data from a variety of countries and can only control for common country-level factors,
which are not sufficiently disaggregated. This study is also the first to examine the potential
effects of anti-corruption efforts on mental health. In doing so, it contributes to a nascent
literature studying the effects of anti-corruption policies in developing countries (e.g., Hao
et al., forthcoming; Xu and Yano, 2017).
Secondly, we also contribute to the emerging literature on the causes of poor mental health
in developing countries. Poor mental health and associated disorders are an important
component of the disease burden in developing countries (Patel, 2007; WHO, 2017). Those
with mental health problems are less likely to engage in the labour market and have lower
labour productivity (Frijters et al., 2014). Previous studies have found negative effects of
economic shocks such as exposure to financial crises, jobs and income loss, and lack of
access to social protection on mental health (e.g., Adhvaryu et al., 2019; Baird et al., 2013;
Friedman and Thomas, 2009; Marcus, 2013). Similarly, other socioeconomic conditions such
as conflict and crime have also been found to adversely affect mental health (Dustmann and
Fasani, 2016; Singhal, 2019). Studies also show that poverty or material deprivation affects
cognitive bandwidth and functioning (Mani et al., 2013; Schilbach et al., 2016). Given that
government corruption is distinctly higher in poorer countries, the poverty-cognition link
could be exacerbated by corruption, thereby imposing a cost on mental health in developing
countries.
Vietnam provides a relevant context for this study. Since the initiation of the Doi Moi reforms
in 1986, Vietnam has made impressive gains in economic and social well-being, headlined by
a dramatic fall in poverty (McKay et al., 2018). However, the reforms (privatization, trade
liberalization, deregulation, etc.) that shifted the economy from a state-led one to one relying
on the private sector, also likely had some negative side effects. First, the country ranks
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among the most corrupt and least transparent in the world. The main forms of corruption
in Vietnam are grease money to provide basic tasks or services, the illegal privatisation of
state property, and the selling of state power. The first, i.e., petty corruption for accessing
basic public goods and services, is the most dominant and visible (Bai et al., 2019). In
2017, Vietnam was ranked 107 out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s index of
perceived corruption in the public sector and had a score well below the average. Corruption
is also an important part of the cost of doing business (Gueorguiev and Malesky, 2012; Rand
and Tarp, 2012). For instance, Gueorguiev and Malesky (2012) show that 35 percent of
Vietnamese businesses paid bribes to compete for government procurement contracts, 23
percent paid bribes to expedite business registration, and 70 percent paid bribes during
customs procedures.
Second, improvements in the Vietnamese health sector have not kept pace with the needs
of the rapidly growing economy, and mental health has not been a priority area. While
prevalence of mental disorders is not estimated to be disproportionate to those in other
neighbouring countries (Vuong et al., 2011), there is unequal access to mental health care
services and primary care providers are inadequately trained (WHO, 2006; Giang et al.,
2010). Results of this study can help inform policy regarding the allocation of resources for
mental health care.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and the empirical specifica-
tion. Section 3 presents the results and Section 4 describes the effects of the anti-corruption
campaign on mental health. Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
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2 Data and estimation strategy
2.1 Data
This study uses data from two sources to assess the relationship between corruption and
mental health in Vietnam. The first data were collected as part of an experimental study
(Vietnam Social Capital Study (VSCS), henceforth) conducted in May-June 2017 in 56
rural communes across 22 provinces in the Red River Delta (in northern Vietnam) and
Mekong River Delta (in southern Vietnam). Figure A1 in the online Appendix depicts
the survey provinces. We obtained listings of households in the communes, and the study
team contacted the households to advertise the study and to encourage participation. Two
sessions with 12 subjects each were organized in each commune, leading to a sample of 1,344
subjects.
After the experiments, enumerators conducted individual face-to-face interviews with all
subjects to complete a post-experiment questionnaire. This collected information on back-
ground characteristics such as age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital status and asset
ownership.
As part of the post-experiment questionnaire, respondents were presented with statements
to elicit individual experiences and beliefs about corruption in the public sector with specific
reference to bribery to obtain land titles, to get a government job, to receive medical treat-
ment etc. Respondents were asked how much they agreed with each of the six presented
statements on a 4-point scale where 1 meant ‘agree completely’, 2 meant ‘somewhat agree’, 3
meant ‘disagree’ and 4 meant ‘disagree completely’. We recode responses to each statement
as 1 if the subject indicates agreement and 0 otherwise, and then construct the individual-
level corruption index as the sum of the responses to these six statements.4 We standardize
4These statements are listed in Table A1 in the online Appendix. These statements were taken from
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the corruption index (by subtracting the mean and dividing by its standard deviation) and
use that as our key explanatory variable.
To measure mental health of the respondents, the questionnaire also included a module on
the 10-item Center for the Epidemiological Studies of Depression short form (CES-D). The
CES-D, developed by Radloff (1977), is one of the main scales used to measure depressive
symptoms internationally and a number of epidemiological studies show that it strongly
predicts clinical diagnoses of depression and anxiety disorders (Weissman et al., 1977). Re-
spondents were asked to indicate how often they had certain feelings in the last week on a
0-3 scale - “never (0 days in a week)”, “sometimes (1-2 days of the week)”, “often (3-4 days
of the week)”, and “all the time (5-7 days of the week)”.5 A higher CES-D score reflects
poorer mental health. We use the CES-D scale to construct two dependent variables. First,
we use the composite score of the 10 questions (ranging from 0 to 30). Second, a score of 10
and above (out of a maximum of 30) is used as an indicator for the presence of significant
depressive symptoms. We use this threshold to construct a dummy variable, ‘severe stress’,
that takes the value 1 for CES-D scores greater than or equal to 10, and 0 otherwise. This
latter measure of mental health has been used widely in other studies (e.g., de Quidt and
Haushofer, 2019; Singhal, 2019).
We exclude a small number of subjects with missing responses to the depressive symptoms
module, the corruption statements, or the socioeconomic characteristics. This results in a
sample of 1,318 respondents in the VSCS.
We also use the 2016 and 2018 waves of the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Sur-
vey (VARHS hereafter). The VARHS is a long-running panel survey of almost 3,500 rural
a summary indicator of the quality of governance titled ‘Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Ad-
ministration Performance Index’ (PAPI). This index is constructed annually from surveys conducted across
Vietnam, to measure the performance of central and local governments in governance, public administration
and public service delivery.
5CES-D questions are provided in Table A2 in the online Appendix.
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households conducted every second year since 2006 in 12 provinces across Vietnam (see
Ayala-Cantu et al., 2017 for details). Mental health is also measured in the VARHS 2016
and 2018 waves using the 10-item CES-D index. The CES-D is only administered to the
primary respondent of the household - the household head or his/her spouse in most cases.
With these data, we also construct the composite CES-D index score as well as the ‘severe
stress’ dummy variable as the outcome variables. With regards to corruption, all households
that reported operating at least one non-farm business are asked if corruption imposed a cost
on their business. The responses are on a 4-point scale where 1 meant ‘very large’, 2 meant
‘large’, 3 meant ‘small’ and 4 meant ‘no effect’. For ease of interpretation, we construct a
continuous measure of ‘corruption costs’ by reverse coding these responses to range from 0 to
3 where 0 indicates ‘no effect’ and 3 indicates ‘very large’ effects. In the regression analysis
we use the standardized version of this corruption measure as the explanatory variable. Fi-
nally, we use a balanced panel, only keeping households that operate a household enterprise
in both rounds. This yields a sample of 956 observations across both rounds.
2.2 Estimation strategy
We use OLS regressions to estimate the relationship between corruption and mental health
in the VSCS data using the following equation:
Yij = α0 + α1Corrij +
K∑
l=2
αlXij + υj + ij (1)
where, Yij is the outcome measure for individual i residing in commune j. The two outcomes
are the composite CES-D score and the ‘severe stress’ indicator, as measured in the first
dataset. The coefficient α1 captures the association between corruption experiences (Corrij)
and mental well-being. Xisj includes individual-level controls such as age, gender (takes a
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value 1 for female), education (takes a value 1 for those who have completed high school),
marital status (takes a value 1 if married), ethnicity (takes a value 1 for the ethnic majority
Kinh), poverty status (takes a value 1 for those classified as poor by the government), and
household’s asset ownership. In addition, we include commune fixed effects (υj) to account
for common factors that affect all individuals within a commune (such as infrastructure,
ethnic composition). Finally, ij corresponds to a random error term. We allow for arbitrary
correlation at the level of the commune by clustering the standard errors at the commune
level.
In the estimations above, we do not make claims of causality. While we have controlled
for all common commune-level factors and several individual-level observables, there may
be individual-level unobserved factors that could influence mental health and be related to
corruption experiences (e.g., household structure). Similarly, the OLS estimate of α1 may
also be biased due to reverse causality if respondents with poorer mental health are more
likely to recall the incidence of corruption. We attempt to reduce this bias by using the
VARHS panel data to estimate the following household fixed effects model:
Yit = β0 + β1CCit + β2Tt +
K∑
l=3
βlXit + ηi + νit (2)
where, Yit is the mental health of the primary respondent in household i at time t. CCit is
the self-reported cost of corruption on the household enterprise at time t, and the parameter
of interest is β1. The vector Xit includes respondent characteristics (gender, age, marital
status, primary school completion dummy), household poverty status, and time-varying
indicator variables to control for household exposure to the following shocks in the preceding
two years: natural disasters (floods, droughts, etc.), pest attacks, and health shocks (death
of a household member or illness). All household-specific time-invariant characteristics are
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captured by the household fixed effect, ηi. By conditioning on household fixed effects, ηi,
we are only exploiting within-household variation in the burden of corruption to estimate
the relationship with mental health. Moreover, this strategy also eliminates regional effects
that are unlikely to change over the two-year survey period (e.g., access to healthcare) and
are potentially correlated with both mental health and corruption. We also control for any
unobserved country-wide macroeconomic conditions at the time of the surveys using year
fixed effects (Tt). νit is an idiosyncratic error term. We cluster the standard errors at the
level of the household to allow household responses to be correlated over time.
Before moving to the results it is important to discuss some caveats. In particular, one
may be concerned about the interpretation of results as both mental health and corruption
measures are self-reported. First, if there is random error in the explanatory variable (self-
reported corruption) or if there is a general tendency to under-report corruption, then the
results will be biased towards zero. Second, if measurement error in the dependent variables
is random, then it will only reduce the precision of the estimates, without biasing the results.
Still, measurement error could be a concern if it correlated with respondents’ characteristics.
However, to the extent that the reporting bias is constant over time, then the household
fixed effects used in equation 2 would account for it. As results in Table 4 show, we still find
corruption to be negatively associated with mental health, indicating that misreporting is




Summary statistics of the VSCS dataset are presented in Table 1. Figure A2 in the online
Appendix presents the distribution of the CES-D scores for the analysis sample. The Cron-
bach’s α is 0.66, which indicates a reasonably high level of internal consistency. Panel A of
Table 1 shows that the average score on the CES-D is 5.05 for the sample and 12 percent of
the sample exhibits symptoms of severe stress.
Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the corruption indicators, the key ex-
planatory variables. Agreement with the various indicators of corruption differs across the
measures. We find that 37 percent of the sample believes that bribes are required to get a
government job. A correspondingly high percentage of respondents believe that bribes are
required in the health and education sectors (32 and 25 percent, respectively).
Finally, Panel C shows summary statistics for the other covariates used in the analysis.6
Overall, the sample of subjects was well-balanced in terms of gender with 52 percent of
subjects being female. The average age is around 38 years while 81 percent were married.
Approximately 54 percent of the sample had completed high school education. On average,
households these subjects belonged to owned 9 out of 16 assets listed in the questionnaire.7
Around 8 percent of them were classified as being poor according to the government author-
6Table A3 in the online Appendix shows the means of the observed characteristics of the VSCS sample and
those of the rural population of the same 22 provinces as computed from the Vietnam Household and Living
Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2016. We find that the two samples are quite similar though the experiment
subjects are more educated. That there is positive selection based on education into participation in such
experiments has also been shown in other work.
7The questionnaire elicited whether households owned each of the following assets: bicycle, black
and white TV, colour TV, scooter/motorcycle/moped, landline telephone, mobile phone, electric fan, ra-
dio/stereo, pump set, refrigerator, computer/laptop, internet access, washing machine, cooler/air condi-
tioner, car/truck/van, and flush toilet.
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ities. Ninety-three percent of the sample belonged to the Kinh majority ethnic group.8
[Table 1 about here]
Summary statistics of the VARHS data are presented in Table A4 of the online Appendix.
We find that for the balanced panel of households that operated non-farm businesses in
2016 and 2018, mental health improved and the costs of corruption declined over time. The
average score on the CES-D declined from 6.94 in 2016 to 5.42 in 2018. Similarly, the
proportion of households exhibiting symptoms of severe stress fell from 0.26 in 2016 to 0.16
in 2018. Correspondingly, the average costs of corruption index fell from 0.5 to 0.36 during
the same period.
We graphically examine the association between corruption and mental health using the
VSCS dataset in Figure 1. Figures 1A and 1B illustrate the relationship between corruption
and CES-D index and with likelihood of severe stress respectively. Both figures show a clear
positive relationship, indicating that psychological stress increases with corruption.
[Figure 1 about here]
3.2 Regression analyses and robustness
Table 2 shows the key results of the paper using the VSCS dataset. The dependent variable
in column 1 is the CES-D index. In column 2 the dependent variable is an indicator for
severe mental stress. As shown in both columns, corruption is positively and significantly
associated with the mental health index. We find that a one standard deviation increase in
the corruption index increases the CES-D score by 0.6 units, and the likelihood of severe
stress by 2.4 percentage points. Given a sample mean of 5.02 for the CES-D index and
8There are 54 officially recognized ethnic groups in Vietnam. The Kinh, the ethnic majority, constitute
around 85 per cent of the population. The ethnic minorities largely reside in the Central Highlands and the
Northern Uplands, and are therefore, slightly underrepresented in this sample.
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12 percent for severe stress, this translates into a 12 percent and a 20 percent increase,
respectively.
[Table 2 about here]
These results are robust to the inclusion of controls in columns 3 and 4. We also find that
females have lower mental health relative to males. This is supported by global evidence
on the female mental health penalty (WHO, 2017) and other studies in Vietnam (Giang et
al., 2010; Leggett et al., 2012). We also find that individuals from poor households report
significantly lower mental health. This is in line with a large emerging literature that finds
income losses to worsen mental health, and that cash transfers and other social security
schemes improve mental health (Angeles et al., 2019; Baird et al., 2013; Haushofer and
Shapiro, 2016).
We examine whether the relationship between corruption and mental health is different
based on gender and poverty status. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, we find that the effect of
corruption on the CES-D index is greater for females as compared to males (column 1) but
this is not so for the severe stress indicator (column 2). This is consistent with other evidence
that shows that females’ mental health is more susceptible to external shocks (Dustmann
and Fasani, 2016). Corruption can further compound the negative relationship between
income/wealth and mental health, as the poor may not have access to mitigation strategies
as the rich do. In columns 3 and 4 we find that the poor who are more exposed to corruption
have lower mental health, but the results are not statistically significant.
[Table 3 about here]
The results in Table 2 are also robust to a number of sensitivity checks. First, we check
whether the results are driven by a particular component of the mental health index. Results
in Table A5 in the online Appendix show that exposure to corruption is significantly related
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to eight of the ten components.
Second, we also check the robustness of the result to a principal component analysis of
the CES-D questions, where we retain the first factor. Using the standardized value of this
factor as the dependent variable, we once again find exposure to corruption to be significantly
related to lower mental health (β(s.e.) = 0.19(0.03)).
Third, we check if the results are sensitive to the construction of the corruption index (Table
A6 of the online Appendix). Instead of recoding the six corruption statements into binary
indicators, we use the corruption statements on the original 1-4 scale where 1 indicates
complete disagreement and 4 indicates complete agreement. The index is then formed by
summing all responses and ranges from 6-24, and then standardized. In columns 1 and 2,
we find that corruption continues to be significantly associated with poorer mental health.
It is also possible that our results are driven by some respondents who report high levels
of corruption. To check for this, we construct a corruption dummy that takes the value 1
if the respondent reports agreement with at least one of the corruption statements and 0
otherwise. This binary measure also mitigates concerns of reverse causality, i.e., the possi-
bility that people reporting worse mental health may be more likely to recall more instances
of corruption. Once again, we find that our results are robust to this reclassification of the
corruption measure (columns 3 and 4).
Fourth, we have so far assumed that all dimensions of corruption have a similar relationship
with mental stress. We now relax this assumption by considering each of the six corruption
measures individually in Tables A7 and A8 in the online Appendix. All six corruption
measures are associated with an increase in the CES-D index (Table A7). Similarly, in Table
A8 we find that 4 out of the 6 corruption measures are significantly associated with an
increase in the probability of severe stress.
Fifth, we also assess the possible degree of omitted variable bias using the approach of Oster
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(2019). The method computes how important the explanatory power of unobservables would
have to be relative to the observables to fully explain the coefficient of interest. Using this
method, we find that for the CES-D index, the explanatory power of the unobservables
would have to be 4.4 times higher than that of the observables and negatively correlated
with observables to be able to explain the results. Similarly in the case of the severe stress
indicator. These results contradict the standard assumption that unobservables are positively
correlated with observables and are equally important, giving us reasonable confidence that
omitted variable bias is not affecting our results.
Finally, we corroborate our findings using an alternative data set (VARHS) and estimation
strategy. We use a balanced panel of households that operated a household enterprise in 2016
and 2018, along with a fixed effects model (equation 2) outlined in Section 2.2 to estimate
results exploiting within-household variation in exposure to corruption over time. The main
explanatory variable is a standardized measure of the intensity of the costs of corruption.
The results using these data and estimation strategy are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table
4. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the costs of corruption is positively
associated with a 0.45 unit increase in the CES-D index score (or a 7.2 percent increase over
the sample mean). In column 2 we find that a 1 standard deviation increase in corruption
is associated with a 5 percentage point increase in severe stress. Given a sample mean of 21
percent, this translates into a 23.8 percent increase. These results are fairly similar to those
noted above in Table 2.
[Table 4 about here]
We also construct a variable that takes the value 1 if the household reports any costs of
corruption and use that as the explanatory variable in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. These
results show that corruption reduces mental health at the extensive margin as well. Together,
these findings show that there is strong consistent evidence that corruption is associated with
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an increase in mental stress.
4 Effects of recent anti-corruption efforts on mental
health
In this section, we assess the impact of the CPV General Secretary’s 2016 anti-corruption
campaign on mental health using the VARHS data. The campaign resulted in the arrests
of several high-profile government officials, executives of state enterprises, and others in
the private sector (Le, 2017; Meyers, 2018). Between January 2016 and August 2018, it is
estimated that 56 government officials were disciplined over corruption and 500 individuals
prosecuted and sentenced in 40 corruption cases (Hoa, 2018). Several new rules have been
put in place to prevent government officials from misusing their power (Reuters, 2019).
Observational reports suggest that this campaign has reduced corruption (Hoa, 2018; Hiep,
2019).
Recall that in the VARHS data ‘corruption costs’ on household enterprises range from 0 to
3 where 0 indicates ‘no effect’ and 3 indicates ‘very large effect’. In this case, the campaign
would matter more for households that were more affected by corruption before the cam-
paign. We exploit this variation in the exposure of households to use a difference-in-difference
approach, where we compare the difference in mental health of affected and unaffected house-
holds before and after the campaign. The panel regressions take the following form:
Yit = γ0 + γ1High corruptioni ∗ Postt + γ2Tt +
K∑
l=3
γlXit + ηi + ωit (3)
where Yit is the mental health of the primary respondent in household i at time t, and Tt and
ηi are year and household fixed effects, respectively. As the anti-corruption efforts started
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in 2016, we take 2018 to be the post-treatment period (captured by the indicator variable
Postt). High corruptioni is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for all households that
report any amount of corruption in 2016. The assumption is that the households that could
potentially benefit from the anti-corruption campaign “treatment” were those that reported
their household enterprises suffering from corruption at baseline. The coefficient of interest,
γ1, estimates the impact of the campaign. We cluster the standard errors at the level of the
household.9
[Table 5 about here]
The results presented in Table 5 show that the anti-corruption campaign significantly im-
proved mental health. Column 1 shows that, relative to households unaffected by corruption,
the CES-D index of household that experienced corruption decreased by 1.15 units due to
the campaign. Given the control mean of 6.73, this translates into a 17 percent improvement.
The effects on the severe stress indicator are in the same direction (7.6 percentage points, or
31 percent over the control mean) but not statistically significant (p−value = 0.11). Overall,
these results suggest that the anti-corruption campaign had meaningful positive effects on
mental health. While this analysis is preliminary in nature, the results are interesting and
worthy of further research.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the limited literature examining the linkages between corruption
and mental health. First, using a cross-sectional sample of over 1,300 respondents across
22 provinces in rural Vietnam, we find strong evidence that day-to-day petty corruption
9An important assumption of this analysis is that in the absence of the anti-corruption campaign, the
trends in mental well-being would have been similar between households that were affected and unaffected
by corruption in 2016.
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is positively associated with psychological distress. Second, we find similar results from a
panel data of non-farm household enterprise owners from 12 provinces in rural Vietnam.
These results are also robust to a variety of other checks. While our study does not make
a definitive claim of causality between corruption and mental health, the robustness of our
results indicate that daily stress factors like corruption are important determinants of mental
health in developing countries.
We also find that the relationship between corruption and mental health is stronger for
women. Given that women are often marginalised and have limited access to mental health
services, this indicates that concerted effects to insulate women from corruption can have
large payoffs. Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that welfare of children is closely
associated with the psychological well-being of their caregivers, who more likely to be women.
This implies that improving mental health of women can have broader impacts on society
by limiting inter-generational transmission of poor mental health.
Fighting corruption remains high on the current policy agenda of the Vietnamese govern-
ment, as evidenced by the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched by CPV Gen-
eral Secretary in 2016. While reductions in economic costs and inefficiencies have been long
recognized as the potential benefits of efforts to mitigate corruption, the findings presented
here suggest that there may be large gains in mental health as well. To that end, we recom-
mend rigorous evaluations of psychosocial interventions in poor institutional settings.
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Figure 1: Relationship between mental health and different levels of corruption
Source: Authors’ illustration based on the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS)
data.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean SD
Panel A: Mental health outcomes
CESD-10 index 5.02 3.71
Severe stress 0.12 0.32
Panel B: Corruption variables
Officials divert funds for private benefit 0.16 0.37
Bribes for land titles 0.28 0.45
Bribes in hospitals 0.32 0.47
Bribes to school teachers 0.25 0.44
Bribes for construction permits 0.20 0.40
Bribes for govt. jobs 0.37 0.48
Corruption index 1.59 1.77




Completed High School 0.54 0.50
Poor Household 0.08 0.27
Number of assets 9.04 2.60
Married 0.81 0.39
Observations 1318
Notes: This table is based on the Vietnam Social Capital Survey
(VSCS) data. The maximum possible score on CES-D index is 30.
Severe stress is an indicator for CES-D index ≥10. The maximum
number of assets is 16. Poor household is an indicator variable for
respondent’s household being classified as poor by the government.
Kinh is the ethnic majority group.
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Table 2: Corruption and mental health
CES-D Index Severe Stress CES-D Index Severe Stress
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption index (z-score) 0.603∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗







Completed High School 0.192 -0.002
(0.217) (0.018)
Poor Household 0.817∗∗ 0.067∗
(0.373) (0.036)




Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 5.02 0.12 5.02 0.12
N 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Severe stress is an indica-
tor for CES-D index ≥10. Standard errors clustered at the commune level are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
25
Table 3: Corruption and mental health: Heterogeneity
CES-D Index Severe Stress CES-D Index Severe Stress
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption index (z-score) 0.354∗∗ 0.022 0.613∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.155) (0.015) (0.096) (0.011)
Corruption index*Female 0.501∗ 0.011
(0.251) (0.023)
Corruption index*Poor 0.097 0.008
(0.361) (0.037)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 5.02 0.12 5.02 0.12
N 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Severe stress is an indicator
for CES-D index ≥10. Controls include age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital status, household assets,
and household poverty status. Poor is an indicator variable for respondent’s household being classified as
poor by the government. Standard errors clustered at the commune level are reported in parentheses. *
significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Corruption and mental health: VARHS Data
CES-D Index Severe Stress CES-D Index Severe Stress
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption costs (z-score) 0.453∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.197) (0.020)
Corruption dummy 0.920∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.378) (0.041)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 6.18 0.21 6.18 0.21
N 956 956 956 956
Notes: This table uses the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) data. Severe stress
is an indicator for CES-D index ≥10. Corruption costs index ranges from 0 to 3. Corruption dummy is
an indicator for Corruption costs > 0. Controls include respondent’s age, gender, primary school com-
pletion, marital status, household poverty status, and household exposure to pest, natural disaster, and
illness/death shocks. Standard errors clustered at household level are reported in parentheses. * significant
at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Anti-corruption campaign and mental health
CES-D Index Severe Stress
(1) (2)
High corruption*Post -1.144∗∗ -0.076
(0.473) (0.048)
Household controls Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Mean of control dep. var. 6.73 0.24
N 956 956
Notes: This table reports results of the difference-in-differences esti-
mation strategy described in Section 4 using the Vietnam Access to
Resources Household Survey (VARHS) data. Severe stress is an in-
dicator for CES-D index ≥10. High corruption is a dummy variable
that takes the value 1 for households that reported corruption in 2016.
Post is an indicator for the post-treatment period of 2018. Controls
include respondent’s age, gender, primary school completion, mari-
tal status, household poverty status, and household exposure to pest,
natural disaster, and illness/death shocks. Standard errors clustered
at household level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,**
significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Online Appendices for:
Corruption and mental health: Evidence from Vietnam
1
Figure A1: Map of the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) study provinces
Source: Authors’ illustration.
2
Figure A2: Density of CES-D score for the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) sample
Notes: The grey line at a CES-D score of 10 represents the threshold for severe stress.
3
Table A1: Corruption statements
Statement
1 In my commune/ward, officials divert funds from the state budget for their personal benefit
2 People have to pay bribes in order to obtain a land title
3 People like me have to bribe to receive medical treatment in the district’s hospitals
4 Parents have to pay bribes to teachers for their children to be better attended at the primary
school nearest to my house
5 In my commune/ward, officials receive kickbacks in exchange for approval of construction permits
6 In order to get a job in the government, people have to pay a bribe
Notes: In the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) respondents were asked how much they agreed with each of the six
presented statements on a 4-point scale where 1 meant ‘agree completely’, 2 meant ‘somewhat agree’, 3 meant ‘disagree’
and 4 meant ‘disagree completely’. For the main analysis we recode responses to each statement as 1 if the subject indi-
cates agreement and 0 otherwise, and then construct the individual-level corruption index as the sum of the responses to
these six statements.
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Table A2: CES-D Index questions
In the last 7 days ....
1 how often did you sleep well?
2 how often were you happy?
3 how often did you have trouble concentrating in what you were doing?
4 how often did you feel hopeful about the future?
5 how often did you feel that everything you did was an effort?
6 how often did you feel lonely?
7 how often did you feel depressed?
8 how often did you feel that you could not “get going”?
9 how often were you bothered by things that don’t usually bother you?
10 how often did you feel fearful?
Notes: Respondents were asked to indicate how often they had these feelings in the last week
on a four-scale metric - “never (0 days in a week)”, “sometimes (1-2 days of the week)”, “of-
ten (3-4 days of the week)”, and “all the time (5-7 days of in a week)”. These responses are
coded from 0 to 3 respectively. The response scale is reversed for the positive questions, so
that they have the same sign as those negative questions.
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Table A3: Comparison of VSCS sample with the VHLSS




High school education 0.54 0.27
Married 0.81 0.78
Kinh 0.93 0.95
Poor household 0.08 0.07
Observations 1344 6438
Notes: This table compares the Vietnam Social Capital Survey
(VSCS) sample characteristics with those in the Vietnam House-
hold and Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2016. The VHLSS
2016 figures are based on information collected from respondents
of rural communes in the same 22 provinces as the experimental
sample. The VHLSS did not collect information on the same assets
reported in Table 1. Poor household is an indicator variable for re-
spondent’s household being classified as poor by the government.
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Table A4: Summary statistics of VARHS data
2016 2018
Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Mental health outcomes
CESD-10 index 6.94 4.22 5.42 3.81
Severe stress 0.26 0.44 0.16 0.37
Panel B: Corruption variables
Corruption costs 0.50 0.69 0.36 0.59
Corruption dummy 0.40 0.49 0.31 0.46
Panel C: Control variables
Female 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50
Age 50.74 12.74 51.61 12.71
Primary school education 0.87 0.33 0.79 0.41
Married 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.35
Poor household 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.15
Natural shock 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22
Health shock 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.11
Pest attack 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Observations 478 478
Notes: The maximum possible score on CES-D index is 30. Severe stress is an indi-
cator for CES-D index ≥10. Corruption costs index ranges from 0 to 3. Corruption
dummy is an indicator for Corruption costs index >0. Poor household is an indicator
variable for respondent’s household being classified as poor by the government.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruption index (z-score) 0.099∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.030
(0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.035)
Mean of dep. var. 0.64 0.48 0.69 0.50 0.91





(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Corruption index (z-score) 0.083∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023)
Mean of dep. var. 0.32 0.22 0.20 0.58 0.47
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Controls include age, gender, edu-
cation, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. Standard errors clustered at the
commune level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A6: Robustness: alternative corruption measures
CES-D Index Severe Stress CES-D Index Severe Stress
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contin. corruption index (z-score) 0.690∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.012)
Corruption dummy 0.974∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.171) (0.018)
Female 0.647∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.019) (0.172) (0.019)
Age 0.015 0.002∗∗ 0.013 0.002∗∗
(0.012) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001)
Kinh -0.220 0.015 -0.279 0.011
(0.678) (0.059) (0.694) (0.061)
Completed High School 0.215 -0.001 0.225 -0.001
(0.224) (0.018) (0.221) (0.018)
Poor Household 0.768∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.870∗∗ 0.070∗
(0.377) (0.036) (0.372) (0.036)
Number of assets -0.097∗ -0.008 -0.092 -0.007
(0.057) (0.005) (0.056) (0.005)
Married -1.346∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -1.284∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.027) (0.307) (0.027)
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 5.02 0.12 5.02 0.12
N 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). In columns 1 and 2, corruption is a
continuous measure in the 6-24 range. In columns 3 and 4, corruption dummy takes the value 1 if the respondent
expressed agreement with any corruption statement and 0 otherwise. Severe stress is an indicator for CESD-10 index
≥10. Standard errors clustered at the commune level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant
at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A7: Detailed corruption measures and CES-D index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Officials divert funds for private benefit 1.075∗∗∗
(0.290)
Bribes for land titles 0.750∗∗∗
(0.238)
Bribes in hospitals 0.850∗∗∗
(0.202)
Bribes to school teachers 0.990∗∗∗
(0.244)
Bribes for construction permits 0.776∗∗∗
(0.215)
Bribes for govt. jobs 1.036∗∗∗
(0.196)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02
N 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Controls include age, gender, education,
ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. The corruption variables are dummy variables
that take value 1 if the respondent indicates agreement and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the commune level
are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A8: Detailed corruption measures and Severe Stress
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Officials divert funds for private benefit 0.060∗
(0.031)
Bribes for land titles 0.026
(0.026)
Bribes in hospitals 0.042∗∗
(0.019)
Bribes to school teachers 0.048∗
(0.026)
Bribes for construction permits 0.021
(0.022)
Bribes for govt. jobs 0.050∗∗
(0.020)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
N 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Controls include age, gender, edu-
cation, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. Severe stress is an indicator for
CES-D index ≥10. The corruption variables are dummy variables that take value 1 if the respondent indicates agree-
ment and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the commune level are reported in parentheses. * significant at
10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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